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Abstract. The design of secure systems requires the use of security analysis techniques. 
Security objectives have to be considered during the early stages of system development 
and design; an executable model will give the designer the advantage of exploring the 
vulnerabilities early, and therefore enhancing the system security. In this work we 
create an executable model of a smart card system using SystemC with the Transaction 
Level Modelling (TLM) extensions. The model includes the security protocols and 
transactions. The model is used to compare a number of authentication mechanisms 
with different probabilities of failure. In addition, a number of probable attacks, 
including theft of a private key and denial of service were modelled to examine the 
vulnerabilities. The executable model shows that security protocols and transactions 
can be effectively simulated in order to design improvements to withstand different 
types of security attacks. 
Key words: Security Modelling, SystemC, Transaction Level Modelling, Protocols, 
Smart Cards. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Robust and secure system design requires the selection and implementation of a set of 
policies, procedures, architectures, technology, and personnel. However, there is no 
system that is 100% secure; there will always be a way to breach the system. The 
objective in security analysis is to identify the weak points. This requires modelling and 
simulation tools.  
We have used an executable model of a smart card system as an exemplar, including 
the security protocols and transactions, to allow examination of the security strengths and 
weaknesses by executing tests on the model. This paper extends work previously 
presented [1]. 
                                                          
 

 Received January 12, 2014 
Corresponding author: Mark Zwolinski 
Electronics and Computer Science, University of Southampton, Southampton SO17 1BJ, UK 
(e-mail: mz@ecs.soton.ac.uk) 
138 A. BUSHAGER, M. ZWOLINSKI 
2. RELATED WORK  
Security protocols are sets of rules designed to ensure particular security goals. 
However, designing and implementing these protocols is difficult and they may fail 
against various attacks. To be able to effectively integrate the security protocols at early 
stages of development, modelling languages and techniques are used to better visualize 
the entire system. One such modelling tool is Communicating Sequential Processes 
(CSP), which is a process algebra that is used to describe and analyse security properties 
and protocols by providing a mathematical framework [2]. However, to be able to use 
CSP, the designer must have specialized knowledge and training, which limits the usage 
of this method. GSPML, [3], is a visual security protocol modelling language. Again, this 
language introduces notations and complex models that are targeted to security specialists. 
Stereotypes and tags are used to create and present security requirements and 
assumptions, constraints may be attached but they should be satisﬁed by modelling 
elements with the related stereotype [4]. The Uniﬁed Modelling Language (UML) 
version 2.0 has been widely used to model security protocols [5]. For example, UMLsec 
[4], [6] is an extension to UML for integrating security related information into UML 
speciﬁcations, by specifying security requirements through stereotypes, tagged values, 
and constraints[7]. 
An adversary can be created in UMLsec to model possible threats to a system. UMLsec 
was used to ﬁnd possible vulnerabilities in Common Electronic Purse Speciﬁcations 
(CEPS) [4], it was also used to deﬁne security permissions that enforce restrictions on the 
workﬂows of a system [8].  
None of the above modelling languages provides an automatic transition from design 
to code implementation. A designer would like to have an executable model that allows a 
better testing of the designed model and therefore links the gap between the design phase 
and the code implantation phase. In our work, an executable model is produced using 
SystemC with the TLM extensions [9]. SystemC has been used to produce a methodology 
to simulate security attacks on smart cards with fault injection [10] and it has also been 
used to create an environment for design veriﬁcation of smart cards using security attack 
simulation [11]. In TLM, communication among computational components is modelled 
by channels and transaction requests are handled by calling interface functions of these 
channel models [12].  
3. USING UML TO MODEL SMART CARD TRANSACTIONS  
As an illustration of our methodology, we use a smart card system. Because smart 
cards are used to store sensitive data such as PINs, passwords, and keys, they are likely 
targets for criminal attacks. The main purpose of an attack is to get hold of this data. 
Attackers might perform various numbers and types of attack on the smart card system.  
3.1. Overview of a Smart Card System 
Figure 1 is a use case diagram that gives an overview of the basic components and 
functions of any smart card system. The use case diagram is a behavioural UML diagram 
that presents the system functionality. In our system, the actors illustrated in the ﬁgure 
represent the main components of the system, which are the User, Smart Card, Smart 
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Card Reader, Client, Server, and Database. The use cases represent the functions or 
services that take place while the system is operating. The focus of the analysis in this 
study will be on the functions of three main components, which are the User, Smart Card, 
and the Smart Card Reader.  
 
Fig. 1 Overview of a Smart Card System 
The system combines three security mechanisms and a smart card ("what the user 
has"). The mechanisms are: PIN, Biometrics, and PKI. The ﬁrst two mechanisms are 
responsible for user identiﬁcation and veriﬁcation, a PIN is: "what the user knows", and 
the biometrics are: "who the user is". PKI veriﬁes the devices in the system.  
When the User decides to use the Smart Card, the ﬁrst step is to insert the Smart Card 
in the Smart Card Reader. The Smart Card Reader has number of jobs: it has to verify 
and authenticate the User and Smart Card, commit transactions, and exchange and 
conﬁrm the User details with the other system components. To be able to demonstrate the 
transactions of the system, another type of UML diagram has to be used, Figure 2. The 
following sections describe the registration phase and the veriﬁcation phase of the smart 
card system and the potential threats and attacks.  
3.2. Smart Card Registration System  
To be able to demonstrate the transactions and message sequence between the smart 
card system objects, a sequence diagram is used, e.g. Figure 2, which is a behavioural 
diagram that shows the interactions of system processes.  
The User provides the required information along with the biometric evidence. The 
system then saves the User details in the Smart Card and captures the ﬁngerprint, which 
is the biometric method used in the proposed design, and produces a template that is 
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stored in the system and the Smart Card. Then, the Registration System requests a PIN 
from the User to be used in future veriﬁcation processes.  
 
Fig. 2 Registration Phase in PIN, Biometrics (Fingerprint), and PKI Smart Card System  
The PIN is stored in the Smart Card for future veriﬁcation. Finally, the smart card 
system requests a private key from the Certificate Authority (CA) to generate a digital 
signature [13]. The CA, on the other hand, requests User veriﬁcation from the Registration 
System, generates a pair of keys for the User. The CA also issues a digital certiﬁcate 
corresponding to the public key, and sends the private key to the Smart Card to generate a 
digital signature that combines the private key and the biometric template of the User.  
3.3. Smart Card System Veriﬁcation  
Figure 3 shows the transactions that take place when the User uses the Smart Card in 
a security environment that combines PIN, Biometrics, and PKI security methods.  
The Sender ﬁrst inserts the PIN, the Smart Card Reader extracts the stored PIN from 
the Smart Card and starts the comparison process. If the match is successful the Smart 
Card Reader will ask for another proof, which is the Sender's ﬁngerprint, otherwise, the 
transaction will be aborted after allowing the Sender three attempts to enter the PIN. The 
Sender scans the ﬁnger through the Smart Card Reader scanner; the Reader will extract 
the Sender's biometric feature and produce a template. The matching process will then 
take place and the result will decide whether the Sender has permission to access the 
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system or not. If the match is true, the Smart Card releases the Sender's private key. Next, 
the Sender starts to send a message to the Receiver; the message is going to be digitally 
signed with the Sender's private key, and the system will request the Receiver's public 
key from the CA to encrypt the message. The CA will send the digital certiﬁcate and the 
message will be encrypted using both the Sender's private key and the Receiver's pubic 
key, therefore, the digital envelope is now ready to be sent securely to the Receiver. 
Finally, the Receiver will send a request to the CA to get the Sender's public key to 
decrypt the message. Again, using both the Sender's public key and the Receiver's private 
key the Receiver will be able to decrypt the message successfully.  
 
Fig. 3 Veriﬁcation Processes in PIN, Biometrics (Fingerprint), and PKI Smart Card System 
These security methods should achieve the security goals of conﬁdentiality, integrity, 
authentication, and non-repudiation. However, each mechanism has its pros and cons. For 
example, ﬁngerprints have disadvantages: How can we know that the biometric provided 
is not subject to misuse? If the User was clever and powerful enough to fool the system 
and use a false ﬁngerprint, then the system will be breached and an intruder will have 
access to the real User's credentials and privileges. The PKI method has its disadvantages 
as well. If one breach takes place during the transaction the Sender and the Receiver can 
both suffer security loss.  
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3.4. Smart Card System Threats  
Threats are the possible means by which a security policy may be breached [14]. A 
threat source can be any person, thing, event, or idea that poses danger to an asset within 
a system in terms of conﬁdentiality, integrity, availability, or legitimate use. Moreover, 
threats can be deliberate or accidental [14]. If deliberate, a threat can be categorized as 
passive, such as network sniffing, or active, such as negligence, errors, attempt to gain 
unauthorized access to the system, or changing the value of a particular transaction by 
malicious persons. Therefore, possible threats on a smart card system include unau-
thorized system access, hacking and system intrusion, information leakage or theft, 
integrity violation (errors and omissions by insiders or outsiders), distributed denial of 
service, illegitimate use (dishonest or disgruntled insiders or outsiders), system 
penetration and tampering. Threat sources have different motivations that may lead to 
various attacks on any government or business information system; therefore, the parties 
involved in the smart card system must be familiar with the human threat environments 
and their different motivations.  
3.5. Possible attacks on a Smart Card System  
Attacks may occur at every single stage of a product's lifecycle, starting from the 
development stage, the manufacturing stage, and ending up with actual usage. Attacks 
that take place at the development stage and the manufacturing stage of a smart card are 
most likely to be carried out by an insider, [15]. Attacks during the smart card use stage 
can be physical or logical [15]. Physical attacks may manipulate the semiconductor itself 
and usually require equipment like microscopes, focused ion beams, etc. [16]. Side-
channel attacks consist of observing behaviour while the information is being processed 
and include timing analysis and power analysis [17].  
In contrast, logical attacks or so-called software attacks do not attack the hardware 
properties directly; they are more focused on the communication and ﬂow of information 
between the smart card and the terminal [15]. Attackers can write malicious software, that 
can be employed in a software attack on a smart card, for example, in smart cards that 
support Java Card it is possible to load and run software. Examples of logical attacks 
could be bug exploits, illegal bytecode, and attacks during PIN comparison.  
Other types of attacks take place during the authentication phase of the smart card 
system, where the user identity is authenticated using different types of authentication 
mechanisms like biometrics [18].  
3.6. Modelling attacks using UMLsec  
After using UML diagrams to express the smart card system protocol and processes, 
and to represent the transactions that take place while messages are exchanged during the 
registration and veriﬁcation processes, in addition to knowing where the areas are that 
could be vulnerable to attacks, it is also essential to test the model against possible 
attacks. UMLsec was used to model attacks, using stereotypes such as secrecy and secure 
information ﬂow along with their tags and constraints. An adversary type in UMLsec can 
have a function called Threat that allows the adversary to commit delete, read, and insert 
attacks. Nevertheless, the model is still static and not executable.  
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4. ANIMATING THE MODEL USING SYSTEMC TLM  
SystemC was developed to support the need for a language that improves the overall 
productivity for designers in the electronic systems ﬁeld [9]. It supports the development 
of complex systems by the design and verification of hardware system components at a 
high level of abstraction. The SystemC library is open source and written in C++. In 
addition, it contains a lightweight kernel that schedules the processes.  
The SystemC library provides concurrent and hierarchical modules, ports, channels, 
processes, and clocks. Large designs are always broken down hierarchically to be able to 
manage complexity; structural decomposition of the simulated model in SystemC is 
speciﬁed with modules. The module is the smallest container with state, behaviour, and 
structure for hierarchical connectivity [9]. Within a module, we use a thread process, 
which is associated with its own thread of execution. Once the thread starts executing it is 
in complete control of the simulation until it chooses to return control to the simulator. 
Hence, the thread process is used to model sequential behaviour [9]. SystemC has two 
ways to pass control to the simulator again, one way is to exit by (return), in this case the 
thread is totally stopped, the other way is by having a (wait), therefore, every thread 
contains an inﬁnite loop and usually has at least one wait function.  
The TLM library is built on top of SystemC and allows abstract communications to be 
modelled in a structured manner. In TLM communication between components is 
modelled by channels and transaction requests, which are implemented by calling 
interface functions of the channel models [12]. The initiator port and the target port are 
distinguished in TLM. An initiator is a module that creates new transactions and passes 
them on by calling a method of one of the core interfaces. The target is a module that 
receives the transactions from the initiator. A system component can be an initiator, a 
target, or an interconnect. The interconnect module accesses a transaction but does not act 
as an initiator or a target for that transaction, for example routers can be interconnect 
modules in a system. Another important element in TLM is the generic payload, which 
allows data abstraction.  
4.1. Smart Card System Simulation  
The executable model produced in our work shows the sequence of transactions that 
occur in the smart card system while the smart card is used; they correspond to the 
transactions in Figure 3.  
Hence, in the executable model, the smart card system objects and their related 
transactions, the lifelines in the UML diagram, are represented as objects – modules in 
SystemC, and the arrows are represented as TLM transactions. The modules have two 
types of socket, an initiator socket that is responsible for sending the transactions and a 
target socket that is responsible for receiving the transactions; both sockets are deﬁned in 
the module structure. The Sender module communicates with the Smart Card module and 
the Smart Card Reader module. An initiator socket from the Sender to the Smart Card is 
created, along with another initiator socket to the Smart Card Reader module, to allow the 
Sender to send transactions to both modules. The initiator is responsible for calling the 
transport function to send the payload to the target socket. On the other hand, a target 
socket is created and then registered in the constructor; the target socket receives the 
payload from the transfer function for processing and response.  
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The next step is creating the threads that correspond to the processes taking place in 
each module, creating the payloads that are transferred from a module to the other, 
creating functions, and setting events and variables. In the smart card executable model, 
the authentication methods used are PIN and biometrics. The user, modelled as part of the 
Sender module, enters the PIN. If the PIN is correct, the user enters the ﬁngerprint. The 
number of attempts allowed for the Sender is programmable. The executable model 
counts the number of attempts, and compares the inserted PIN and ﬁngerprint with the 
saved PIN and ﬁngerprint template in the smart card. Also, there is a time limit for 
inserting the PIN and ﬁngerprint, otherwise a timeout message will appear. If the number 
of incorrect attempts exceeded the limit, the system blocks the smart card and saves the 
smart card ID in the banned smart card list. Errors in entering the correct PIN vary; it 
could be wrong digits, taking a long time to insert the correct PIN, or an attacker trying to 
insert the PIN randomly.  
The same steps take place when entering a ﬁngerprint. The successful attempts at PIN 
and ﬁngerprint entry will conﬁrm that the Sender is a legitimate user. Therefore, when the 
Sender passes the authentication step, the smart card releases the private key. Then the 
transactions related to signing the message with the private and public keys take place, 
and ﬁnally the system sends the digitally signed message to the Receiver. In reality, the 
User enters the PIN and scans the ﬁngerprint through an input device like a keypad, 
biometric scanner, or touch pad. However, our executable model can randomise the PIN 
and ﬁngerprint entries, and also randomise the correct and incorrect time. A simple 
pseudo-random number generator is used to randomise the PIN and ﬁngerprint entries 
along with randomising the correct and incorrect time in seconds. The simple random 
number generator is fast and provides better randomness properties like adjusting the 
ratios, changing the range of sample smart cards to be tested, and modifying the 
probabilities of failure. An arbitrary ratio of successful PIN and ﬁngerprint is used; it can 
be modiﬁed to allow ﬂexibility in testing different probabilities of failure. 
The executable module has the smart card system objects and their related 
transactions. The lifelines in the UML diagram are represented as objects, modules in 
SystemC, and the arrows are represented as transactions using TLM. The transitions in 
the output correspond to the transaction number in the UML diagram in Figure 3. 
Obviously, the designer can observe the attempts to enter the right PIN and Biometric 
along with the required timing. This allows the testing of the effectiveness of the authen-
tication methods used. By running the simulation on different numbers of smart cards 
with different probabilities of failure it is possible to evaluate the effectiveness of each 
authentication method.  
4.2. Testing the Authentication Methods  
Validation of the authentication methods in the smart card system is based on two 
proposed models. The ﬁrst model uses a PIN followed by a biometric authentication 
method, while the second model reverses the sequence. The main reason behind carrying 
out these correctness tests is to check that the simulation using the executable model is 
actually working. The purpose of these tests is to verify:  
 The functionality/workability of the smart card simulation tool and the availability 
of test results;  
 The reliability of the smart card simulation tool through simulation;  
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 The degree of ﬂexibility in assigning thresholds and failure probabilities, which 
will assist in customising the simulation tool based on the industry and sector in 
which the smart card system will be used;  
 The speed of testing, which allows users of the simulation tool to obtain results 
and manipulate thresholds with ease and ﬂexibility.  
The following tests have been performed:  
1. PIN followed by biometrics.  
2. Biometrics followed by PIN.  
For each of these tests, an arbitrary probability of failure has been assigned to each of 
the authentication methods. For example, the probability of failure for the PIN is set at 
15%, for the biometrics (ﬁngerprint) it is set at 10%, and the time allowed for entering the 
correct pin and correct ﬁngerprint is set at 10 seconds for each. The reason for assuming 
that the PIN has a slightly higher probability of failure is that the PIN authentication 
method is weaker than the biometrics and thus there is a higher probability of successful 
attacks and user errors and mistakes.  
The first test (PIN followed by Biometrics) used 100 to 3,000 smart cards. Table 1 
displays the results for the authentication method based on the scenarios of potential 
failure/error.  
Table 1 Results from Testing the PIN followed by Biometrics Authentication Method  
Remarks   Number of simulated smart cards  
 100  500  1000  1500  2000  2500  3000  
good pin decoded  100  500  998  1490  1976  2464  2950  
pin incorrect/re-enter correct pin  16  102  207  302  394  493  587  
timeout error (pin)  9  58  125  189  257  299  376  
good bio decoded  100  500  998  1490  1976  2464  2950  
bio incorrect/re-enter correct bio  13  38  82  126  167  200  234  
timeout error (bio)  11  58  124  171  236  299  359  
An examination of the results may be interpreted according to the industry and sector 
of use, which dictate the levels of acceptable thresholds and probabilities of failure. 
Initially, when examining the relationship between the expected and observed results of 
failure attempts across all sample sizes we are able to conﬁrm that it is a linear 
relationship and that observed failure attempts are always below the expected range.  
In a sample of 3,000 cards, failure attempts are 963 over 30% of the sample size. This 
failure percentage alerts us to the vulnerability of the system. This entails a low level of 
acceptance of usage from both parties due to the increased risks represented by the use of 
this method. Having such a high degree of risk and vulnerability in the system will 
expose it to numerous additional threats from different sources.  
The results of the expected and observed PIN and Biometric failure attempts are listed 
in Table 2 and recorded as percentage of the total sample size. 
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Table 2 Percentages of Expected and Observed PIN followed by Biometrics Failure Attempts 
Number of Smart Cards  100  500  1000  1500  2000  2500  3000  
Percentage Observed (PIN)  8  11  11  11  11  11  11  
Percentage Expected (PIN)  15  15  15  15  15  15  15  
Percentage Observed (BIO)  8  6  7  7  7  7  7  
Percentage Expected (BIO)  10  10  10  10  10  10  10  
When comparing the observed PIN failure attempts to the biometrics failure attempts, 
it is noted that the percentages are 11% and 7%, respectively. Although the difference is 
relatively small, it indicates that the PIN authentication method requires additional 
monitoring, particularly in avoiding risks of external threats that pose potential harm 
against the users and system conﬁdentiality and privacy. Furthermore, under the 
simulation of 1,000 smart cards, it is noted that two cards have been banned for reaching 
the maximum attempts of PIN entry. However, as the sample size increases, the number 
of banned smart cards grows signiﬁcantly as illustrated in Figure 4. 
 
Fig. 4 Smart Cards Banned in PIN and Biometrics Proposed Model 
For example when simulating 3000 smart cards, about 50 of them were banned during 
the PIN authentication step. On the other hand, for the Biometrics authentication method, 
it is noted that no smart cards have been banned when using this method. This is a clear 
indication of the level of security that the use of Biometric authentication provides when 
adopted by smart cards, particularly ones that store and have access to sensitive data.  
In the second test, the initial expectation is that the use of a Biometrics authentication 
ﬁrst will decrease the possibility of failure attempts and attacks. This mechanism supports 
the security concept of using something you own (smart card), something you are 
(Biometrics), and something you know (PIN). 
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When using the Biometrics authentication method before the PIN, the number of 
banned smart cards is recorded at 7 and 2 consecutively for a sample size of 3,000 smart 
cards. This is low compared to when the PIN is used prior to the Biometrics where the 
number of banned smart cards was 50 and 0 consecutively for a sample size of 3,000. 
Given the beneﬁts to the user and administrator, as well as the practicality of using the 
Biometrics and PIN authentication methods across most industries, it is recommended to 
adopt this method in the given order as it provides better security levels. 
In summary, the executable model developed using SystemC TLM allowed the 
designer to test the proposed models that support a combination of authentication 
methods; by running simulations on different number of smart cards with different 
authentication methods and recording the results, the designer can examine the robustness 
of the proposed models in terms of enhancing security speciﬁcally during the phase of 
authenticating the smart card system users. The simulation tool provided a quick, 
automated, and ﬂexible environment to test the proposed models, in addition to allowing 
the designer to observe and modify the transactions whenever changes are required.  
Testing the proposed model against physical and logical attacks while the smart card 
is in use has resulted in giving the attacker the chance to get hold of the users private key, 
and therefore violating numbers of security properties like authentication, conﬁdentiality, 
privacy, and integrity. This in essence shows that the system is vulnerable to threats and 
successful attacks taking place. Yet, to be able to reduce the probability of successful 
attacks, our approach allows the designer to modify the executable model to test against 
future attacks.  
4.3. Simulating Attacks on Smart Card System  
There are different types of attacks that have different probabilities of occurrence and 
different consequences for the smart card system and its users. Each attack targets 
different areas of the system and has a speciﬁc goal; some attacks violate the smart card 
system authentication, privacy, and conﬁdentiality like attacks on PIN or attacks on 
biometrics. Other attacks violate the smart card system integrity, reliability, and even 
authentication like invasive attacks, side channel attacks, etc. Figure 5 is a UML sequence 
diagram that demonstrates the types of attacks that may occur in any smart card system, 
even though safeguards and controls like PIN, Biometrics, and PKI are in place.  
The purple callouts represent the types of possible attacks that an attacker can carry 
out in that area precisely; in addition, the red callouts represent the attacks that are 
created in the executable model to test the system robustness.  
The executable model allows us to simulate an attack on the system. An attack on any 
part of the system is essentially another transaction inserted into the model. For example, 
to simulate an attack that allows the attacker to steal the private key released from the 
smart card object, which is coded as a state machine, an attacker is implemented as a 
class that can intrude into multiple modules in a thread-safe manner. Thus, a transaction 
is effectively inserted into the model with one line of code at the appropriate point in the 
smart card module.  
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Fig. 5 Possible Attacks on PIN, Biometrics (Fingerprint), and PKI Smart Card System 
Now, the model waits for transitions 1 to 8 to occur, and then the attacker interferes 
and attacks the system after transition 8 where the private key is released, Figure 6. 
smartcard_reader_object: begin transition 8  
smartcard_reader_object: end transition 8 
sender_object: end transition 5 Attacker initialized,  
@104 s Attacker stole the private key, @104 s  
smartcard_object: begin transition 9  
smartcard_object: end transition 9  
Fig. 6 Simulated Private Key Theft 
In this example, the attacker has to conduct a physical or logical attack to be able to 
get hold of the private key. For example, the attacker can practise a successful side 
channel attack, invasive attack, attacks during PIN comparison, or attacks on Biometrics. 
The executable model in this study does not simulate the physical or logical attack; it 
only assumes that a physical or logical attack has taken place. For that reason, it 
simulates an attack and creates an attacker class with features that allow the attacker to 
modify the transitions and as a result gain access to the user's secret information, 
speciﬁcally the private key.  
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Another example of utilising the executable module in attacks simulation is by 
modelling another sort of an attack, which is carried out on the key exchange operation. 
This time the attacker monitors the public keys exchanged between the users and the CA, 
and gets hold of the users' public keys. Being able to interfere with the key exchange 
protocol opens a door for the attacker to practice attacks that result in network disruption 
and loss of user trust like for example carrying out a man-in-the-middle attack [19], or a 
multi-protocol attack [20]. This example focuses on modelling an attack that allows the 
attacker to interfere through the transactions exchanged between the user and the receiver 
and gets hold of the data exchanged without both of the users knowing, by being able to 
model the attack, it is possible to point out a gap in the protocol that allows an attacker to 
monitor the ﬂow of data, interfere within the transactions, and get hold of the public keys 
exchanged, Figure 7. 
smartcard_object: begin transition 13 
certificate_authority_object: begin transition 14 
certificate_authority_object: end transition 14  
Attacker stole the receiver public key, @203 s 
smartcard_object: end transition 13  
smartcard_object: begin transition 15  
smartcard_object: end transition 15  
smartcard_object: begin transition 16  
smartcard_object: end transition 16  
receiver_object: begin transition 17 
certificate_authority_object: begin transition 18  
certificate_authority_object: end transition 18  
Attacker stole the sender public key, @206 s  
receiver_object: end transition 17  
Fig. 7 Simulated Public Key Theft 
A Denial of Service (DOS) attack is simulated using the same model. The attack aims 
at violating the availability property of the system security.  
The DOS attack will take place against the Certiﬁcate Authority server; the attacker 
attempts to exhaust the server, which will result in the server being unable to provide the 
services for legitimate users. The following is part of the DOS attack simulation output:  
As the output shows, the transactions of the smart card system are running normally, 
however, when the DOS attack successfully takes place, the service is denied and the 
attacker gets hold of the users public keys exchanged among the system objects. In 
addition, the subsequent transactions failed to occur because the Certiﬁcate Authority 
server is unavailable. This attack shows that the availability property has been violated 
and the system users will not be able to use their smart cards until the Certiﬁcate 
Authority server recovers from the attack.  
DOS attacks are indistinguishable from legitimate sign-in requests. The only 
differentiation is in the frequency of sign-in attempts and their origin. A large number of 
sign-in attempts in rapid succession can be indicative of a DOS attack. Hence, smart card 
systems can be protected from DOS attacks by identifying high frequency of login 
attempts from a source and denying service to the source of such attack. Another 
effective way is to limit the number of login attempts a user is allowed at a time.  
In summary, the executable model developed using SystemC TLM allowed the 
designer to test the proposed models that support a combination of authentication 
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methods; by running simulations on different number of smart cards with different 
authentication methods and recording the results, the designer can examine the robustness 
of the proposed models in terms of enhancing security speciﬁcally during the phase of 
authenticating the smart card system users. The simulation tool provided a quick, 
automated, and ﬂexible environment to test the proposed models, in addition to allowing the 
designer to observe and modify the transactions whenever changes are required. In addition, 
the SystemC TLM executable model also allowed the designer to discover the weak points 
of the system and point out vulnerabilities; the successful attacks indicate that there are 
weaknesses in the security protocol. To be able to reduce the probability of successful 
attacks, the designer can modify the executable model to test against future attacks.  
In contrast with the UML diagram, the animation makes it possible to see the attack 
actually happening. Moreover, it is possible to make changes easily within the model and 
to try a number of attacks to test the system's robustness by simply inserting transactions 
into the UML diagram, and transforming them into transactions within the SystemC TLM 
executable model. 
5. CONCLUSION  
UML diagrams are an excellent way of modelling systems, along with their 
extensions; they have features that show the designer how things should work. However, 
UML does not allow the designer to see what happens if something goes wrong with the 
system. Therefore, to be able to see things happening and give reasons about the system, 
simulation has to take place. SystemC TLM was used to transform a static UML model 
into an executable model. The executable model providing the opportunity to see the 
transaction ﬂow within the system objects in an animated manner. In addition, it allowed 
the simulation of attacks in different parts of the system. The model gives a clear view of 
the weaknesses in the security requirements, methods, and protocols used in the smart 
card system.  
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